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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 26, 1986, the Tort Reform Act,' was signed into
law by Governor Thompson. This Act is Illinois' response to the
perceived insurance crisis,2 and effects a myriad of changes in the
present law of negligence and strict products liability. It applies to
causes of action accruing on or after November 25, 1986. 3
* Partner, Phelan, Pope & John; B.S., 1966, Loyola University of Chicago; J.D.,
1969, Northwestern University.
** Associate, Phelan, Pope & John; B.A., 1981, Northern Illinois University; J.D.,
1985, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-1431 (West). The sections of the Act relevant to this
article have been codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 2-604.1, 2-611, 2-1003, 2-
1101.1, 2-1116, 2-1117, 2-1118, 2-1205.1, 2-1207 (Supp. 1986). The Governor has been
vocal in his support of legislative efforts concerning tort reform. Interview with Ms.
Ellen Craig, Director of Citizens Assistance and Consumer Affairs (July 16, 1986).
2. Whether this crisis actually exists is open to debate. See The Guilty Parties in the
Great Liability Insurance Crisis, ECONOMIST, Mar. 22, 1986, at 23; Kovach, Insurance
"Crisis" on Trial; Proposed Federal Legislation Spurs Retort, INDUS. WK., Apr. 14, 1986,
at 21; Alliance for Consumer Rights, Briefing Book- The Facts About the Insurance Cri-
sis; Stopping the Industry Ripoff, May 23, 1986, at 24; Neubauer & Henke Medical Mal-
practice Legislation; Laws Based on a False Premise, 21 TRIAL 64 (1985).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, para. 429.7 (Supp. 1986). Article 10 of the Act, which
pertains to automobile insurance, has an alternative effective date of January 24, 1987.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755.13 (Supp. 1986).
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The Act alters the doctrines of joint and several liability, 4 modi-
fies the collateral source rule,5 limits the availability of punitive
damages,6 changes our present system of "pure" comparative neg-
ligence to "modified" comparative negligence,7 and adds a federal
rule 11 sanctions clause that parellels Federal Rule 11.8 In addi-
tion to these changes, statutes governing municipal law are altered
significantly. Because the Act applies only to causes of action ac-
cruing after November 25, 1986, its effects will not be apparent for
some time.9
This article will discuss sections of the Act that change basic
legal theories and practice in Illinois. It also will analyze the prac-
tical effects of those changes. Finally, the article will address the
likely impact of the changes on the perceived insurance crisis.
II. THE STATUTORY CHANGES IN THE TORT REFORM ACT
A. Changes in the Comparative Negligence Standard
Prior to passage of the Act, Illinois applied the pure comparative
negligence doctrine in tort cases. The result of a judicial man-
date,"° the pure system of comparative negligence allowed a plain-
tiff to recover even though he or she was contributorily negligent.
The percentage of the plaintiff's negligence reduced the damage
award. " I
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the pure comparative negli-
gence system in Alvis v. Ribar.12 In Alvis, the court consolidated
two auto accident cases to consider the fairness of the contributory
negligence and comparative negligence systems. The supreme
court considered the common law doctrine of contributory negli-
gence unnecessarily harsh and reasoned that a system of compara-
tive negligence would effectuate a socially desirable distribution of
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras.2-1117, 2-1118 (Supp. 1986).
5. Id. at para. 2-1205.1.
6. Id. at para. 2-604.1.
7. Id. at para. 2-1116.
8. Id. at para. 2-611.
9. Presently, the average personal injury complaint with a jury demand filed in the
Law Division of Cook County takes eight years from the date of filing until the date of
trial. Personal injury cases without a jury demand take four years to reach trial. The
case load in the Law Division rose 16% from 1985 to 1986. Telephone interview with
Judge A. Sorrentino, Presiding Judge Law Division, Circuit Court of Cook County (Au-
gust22, 1986); Telephone interview with Frank Belmonte, Court Systems Manager (Au-
gust 22, 1986).
10. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
11. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 3.2 (2d ed. 1986).
12. 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
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loss.' 3 The court, however, had to decide whether it should adopt
a pure or modified form of comparative negligence. In analyzing
the merits of the pure and modified forms, the court reasoned that
a defendant's liability should be determined by the percentage of
his or her fault in relation to the ultimate damages. 4 The court
concluded that a pure system of comparative negligence satisfied
this goal because neither party escaped liability for his negligent
acts. 5 The court rejected the modified form because it retained an
aspect of contributory negligence that the court wished to avoid.
The court stated that the modified form created a contributory
negligence rule for those plaintiffs who are more than 50% at fault
for their injuries.16 Finally, the court noted that proponents of the
modified form claim that it reduces insurance costs. The court re-
sponded by citing a study that found the difference in insurance
rates between states with pure and modified systems to be
minimal. 17
The new Act rejects the system of pure comparative negligence
developed in Alvis for a modified comparative negligence system.
The pure system awards damages to a plaintiff regardless of his
percentage of fault. This aspect of the pure form generated sub-
stantial criticism. 8 Now, in negligence actions and products liabil-
ity actions based on strict liability, a plaintiff who is found to be
more than 50% at fault in an action for personal injury or property
damage is barred from recovery. 19 The new system is often called
the greater fault bar approach 20 because the plaintiff recovers noth-
ing if his or her fault exceeds the defendant's. 2'
Under the new system, a plaintiff will recover $25,000 if dam-
13. Id. at 17, 421 N.E.2d at 893. The court stated that "the concept of comparative
negligence which produces a more just and socially desirable distribution of loss is de-
manded by today's society." Id.
14. Id. at 25, 421 N.E.2d at 897.
15. Id.
16. The Alvis court stated, "[w]e agree with the Li court that the '50% system' sim-
ply shifts the lottery aspect of the contributory negligence rule to a different ground."
Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 27, 421 N.E.2d at 898 (citing Li v.Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829,
532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975)).
17. Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 26, 421 N.E.2d at 897 (citing Rosenberg, Comparative Negli-
gence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey, 13 ARK. L. REV.89 (1959)). Five years
later, however, the legislature argued that the modified system would lower insurance
costs that the pure system had raised. See JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF ILLINOIS SENATE,
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, June 30, 1986, at lines 113-20 [hereinafter CONFER-
ENCE COMMITTEE REPORT].
18. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (1986).
20. W. PROSSER & P. KEATON, TORTS § 67, at 473 (5th ed.1984).
21. Id. Under another version of modified comparative negligence, the equal fault
19861
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ages are determined to be $50,000 and the plaintiff is found to be
50% at fault. A plaintiff who is found to be 51% at fault recovers
nothing. The greater fault bar approach ensures that a plaintiff
who is more at fault than the defendant will not recover damages.
The Act also requires an ultimate outcome jury instruction if a
party requests one. If requested, the jury will be instructed in writ-
ing that the defendant shall not be found liable if the plaintiff is
more than 50% of the proximate cause of the injury.22 Ultimate
outcome jury instructions in comparative negligence jurisdictions
have been controversial because of their potential to skew a ver-
dict. Critics of such instructions argue that the jury will return a
logical verdict if it does not know the effects of a 51% finding.
These critics believe that sympathy verdicts are avoided if the jury
is unaware of the consequences of its finding.23 Proponents of the
instructions believe that an informed jury is less likely to speculate
about the effect of its verdict.24 The Act resolves this controversy
in favor of informing the jury of the consequences of its decision.25
The change from pure comparative negligence to a modified ver-
sion is an attempt by the legislature to reinstate a system based on
fault.2 6 This return to a fault system was recommended in a recent
federal study.27 Ostensibly, the change is intended to alleviate the
bar approach, the plaintiff recovers nothing if his or her fault is equal to that of the
defendants. Id.
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1107.1 (Supp. 1986).
23. See McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 423, 424 n.2 (citing case au-
thorities supporting theory juries should not be instructed on the effect of their fact find-
ing answers), Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).
24. Thomas v. Board of Township Trustees, 224 Kan. 539, 582 P.2d 271 (1978); V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, § 17.5.
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1107.1 (Supp. 1986).
26. See, e.g., CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 17, at line 276 (state-
ment of Sen. Berman). Senator Berman's comments during debate on the proposed sys-
tem illustrate the legislative interest in a system based on fault:
On the point of view of [sic]... meaningful changes in the tort system, let me
point out to you that we've addressed something that a lot of people felt should
be changed and that is modified comparative fault; and sometimes these fancy
titles mislead the public, but what that means in simple language is that if I'm
involved in an automobile accident with another guy and I am more than half at
fault, I cannot collect anything. A lot of people felt that that's the way the
system ought to work.
Id.
27. See REPORT OF TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND
AFFORDABILITY 61-62 (1986) [hereinafter POLICY REPORT]. In October 1985, the
United States Attorney General established the Tort Policy Working Group. The Work-
ing Group, composed of representatives from ten agencies and the White House, was
authorized to investigate the insurance crisis. The Working Group's findings were pub-
lished in a report released in February 1986. Id. at 1. The Working Group noted tort
[Vol. 18
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insurance crisis. Nevertheless, the new system may not achieve
this goal.28 Further, the modified system enriches a substantially
negligent defendant who is less than 50% at fault. There is little
justice in allowing a defendant who is 49% at fault to escape the
consequences of his or her negligence.
Proponents of the modified system claim that it will facilitate
settlements and reduce judicial administrative costs. 29 States that
have changed from a pure to modified system, however, actually
have shown a slight decrease in settlements. 30 Also, the claimed
reduction in administrative costs is purely speculative and requires
further study.3
In contrast, the pure comparative negligence system allocates li-
ability according to fault. Each person in a lawsuit is held liable
for his or her portion of fault. Because of this obvious fairness, it is
not surprising that many commentators and the Illinois Supreme
Court have recommended the pure system.3 2
If the Illinois Supreme Court and critics of the new system are
correct, the Act's change in the negligence standard will not effect
a change in the perceived crisis. While the modified approach ap-
pears to be a more just approach to compensation, the reality is
that many substantially negligent defendants will avoid liability for
their acts. Thus, the change may neither promote justice nor solve
the perceived insurance crisis.
B. Changes in the Doctrine of Joint and Several Liability
The Tort Reform Act also alters the doctrine of joint and several
law's shift in focus from concepts of deterrence and compensation to those of societal
insurance and risk spreading. The investigators criticized this trend and its promotion of
no-fault liability. Id. at 30-33.
28. Five years after the Alvis court decided that the modified comparative negligence
system would not reduce the insurance costs, the Tort Policy Working Group reached
the same conclusion. Id. at 22-25, 31 n.24. The Working Group found that the insur-
ance industry was attempting to match premiums to risk, an approach that had not been
undertaken since the boom years of the late 1970's and early 1980's. Id. During that
period, interest rates allowed insurance companies to engage in price wars. Id. at 22-25.
Subsequently, insurance prices have stabilized. Nevertheless, once the companies' profit-
ability is restored, the price of insurance probably will remain high. Therefore, the
Working Group did not predict its suggested reforms would solve the problem of insur-
ance affordability or availability. Id. at 22-28. See also Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 26, 421 N.E.2d
at 897.
29. McKinnon, The Case Against Comparative Negligence, 28 CAL. ST. B.J. 23
(1953).
30. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, § 21.3 (citing Rosenberg, supra note 17).
31. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, § 21.3.
32. Alvis, 85 Il. 2d at 26, 421 N.E.2d at 897; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, § 21.3.
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liability.13 Illinois is now in the minority of states that have modi-
fied or abolished joint and several liability.34 The new section
states that any defendant whose fault is less than 25% of the plain-
tiff's fault is severally liable for the claimed damages.3 5 If a de-
fendant's fault is more than 25% of the fault attributable to the
plaintiff, that defendant is jointly and severally liable for the
claimed damages.36 All of the defendants found liable are jointly
and severally liable for any past and future medical and medically
related expenses incurred by the plaintiff.37 Also, defendants found
liable for injuries involving the discharge of chemicals or pollutants
into the environment will remain jointly and severally liable, while
those who attempt to remedy the situation or handle the waste are
only subject to the 25% rule.38
The former joint and several liability doctrine had been the sub-
ject of criticism in the wake of the perceived insurance crisis. Even
those who previously had not favored tort reform argued that the
doctrine had to be changed. In 1984 and 1987, the American Bar
Association formed special committees to analyze the tort liability
system. The 1984 committee published a report, entitled the Bell
Committee Report, that found the system adequate for resolving
disputes between tortfeasors and their victims.39 The Bell Commit-
33. The modified system was adopted in part as a compromise to the business com-
munity's initial attempt to abolish the pure system. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 17, at line 117 (statement of Sen. Rock); line 229 (statement of Sen.
Schuneman).
34. See N.Y. Times, July 14, 1986, at Al, col. 1. The following states have modified
joint and several liability: Indiana (IND. CODE § 5B-287 (1985)); Iowa (1984 Iowa Acts
668.1, 619.17); Louisiana (LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2324 (West 1982)); Minnesota
(MINN. STAT. ANN, § 604.01(1) (West 1986)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141(3)
(1975)); Oklahoma (Lambach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (1978); Boyles v. Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (1980)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 18.485 (1983)); Penn-
sylvania (42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7102(b), 8322-8354 (Supp. 1986)); Texas (TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985)); Washington (WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4-22.070 (1986)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE §§ 55-7B-8 to -9 (1986)).
The following states have abolished joint and several liability: Kansas (Brown v. Keill,
224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7.a
(1983)); New Mexico (Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); Bartlett v.
New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (1982)); Ohio (OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2) (1986)); and Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036
(Supp. 1986)). Also, Connecticut, Utah, and Wyoming abolished joint and several liabil-
ity in the last few months. Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 21 A.B.A.
J. 61, 62 (1985).
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1117 (1986).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See American Bar Association Special Committee Report, Towards a Jurispru-
dence of Injury: The Continuing Creation of a System of Substantive Justice in American
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tee Report, however, criticized the doctrine of joint and several
liability and suggested reforms in this area.40 The 1987 committee,
the Action Commission, also suggested modifications of the joint
and several liability doctrine.4' Most critics of the doctrine argue
that a defendant should pay only for his portion of fault for an
injury because "[o]ne injustice shouldn't provoke another injus-
tice."' 42 The effect of the rule has been to encourage plaintiffs to
sue defendants who are "only minimally at fault, but who happen
to have deep pockets." 43 Therefore, to remedy harsh results,44 crit-
ics have argued that the doctrine of joint and several liability
should be eliminated.45 Nevertheless, the Act's modifications are a
compromise at best4 6 and have been criticized as ineffectual.47
Interpretational problems also may arise from the Act's ambigu-
ous language. The section that altered the damage formula is sub-
ject to two different interpretations. The section states that, once a
defendant's fault is found to be less than 25% of the plaintiff's,
"the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party defend-
ant who could have been sued by the plaintiff, shall be severally
liable for all other damages. "48 If the language is interpreted to
mean that only those third parties the plaintiff could have sued are
considered in the damages formula, then any defendants who may
have immunity or are insulated from suit by the plaintiff will not be
considered in the damages allocation and each party's percentage
of fault may be higher. On the other hand, this section also could
Tort Law 11-44 (1984) [hereinafter A.B.A. REPORT]. The Committee stated that the
present system of jurisprudence "offers professionally refined answers, developed over
time, to concrete disputes." Id.
40. Id. at 13-17.
41. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE ACTION COMMIS-
SION TO IMPROVE THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM (1987) [hereinafter ACTION COMMIS-
SION REPORT].
42. Granelli, supra note 34, at 63.
43. Birnbaum, Tort Proposals Analyzed, NAT'L L.J., June 23, 1986 (Special Litigation
Section), at 18.
44. See Granelli, supra note 34, at 61. Mr.Granelli began his article with examples of
extreme cases in which the doctrine of joint and several liability has led to inequitable
results. He cited, for example, a case in Los Angeles in which a driver high on drugs
went through a stop sign and was broadsided by another motorist. The jury returned a
verdict of $2.16 million against the driver and the City of Los Angeles, which had failed
to trim the bushes that partly obstructed the view of the driver. Id.
45. Id. The Tort Policy Working Group also has suggested eliminating the doctrine
unless the plaintiff can prove concerted action on the part of the defendants. POLICY
REPORT, supra note 27, at 64-65.
46. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
47. See CONFERENCE COMMII-FEE REPORT, supra note 17, at line 236 (statements of
Sen. Schuneman).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1117 (1986).
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be interpreted to mean that non-party defendants who could have
been joined by the plaintiff, but who are not sued, also are consid-
ered in the damages formula. In the latter case, each party's recov-
ery is reduced in proportion to the non-party's percentage.
C. Changes in the Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule has been settled law in most states
since the early part of the century.49 One of the earliest Illinois
cases involving application of the rule was Pittsburgh, Cincinnati &
St. Louis Railway Company v. Thompson.5" In Thompson, the
plaintiff passenger was injured on a train operated by the defend-
ant. The plaintiff was awarded $5,000. The defendant appealed,
claiming that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury to deduct
from the damages any sum paid to the plaintiff by his insurance
company was reversible error.5" The appellate court disagreed,
stating that "[i]f such sum was paid, it was not pro tanto a dis-
charge of the railway company."52
The Illinois appellate court in Thompson properly addressed the
dual aims of the tort system, deterrence and compensation, when it
refused to allow the defendant to benefit from the plaintiff's insur-
ance coverage. The collateral source rule, however, has been criti-
cized as the wrong doctrine to fulfill these aims.5 3 Critics of the
doctrine argue that the rule treats identically the intentional
wrongdoer, the negligent tortfeasor, and the strictly liable
tortfeasor. Further, the burden of the damage award often is not
placed on the wrongdoer, but on insurers and the public.54 Even
the fairness of applying the collateral source doctrine in situations
when the plaintiff has paid for his or her own insurance has been
questioned. Critics argue that while an insured is paying for secur-
ity, he or she should not receive more than was bargained for.55
49. See, e.g., Evans v. Chicago, Minn. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 133 Minn. 29, 158 N.W.
335 (1916); Gray v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 275 Mass. 143, 102 N.E. 71 (1913);
Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W. 633 (1908);
Cornish v. North Jersey Street Ry. Co., 73 N.J.L. 273, 62 A. 1004 (1906); Louisville & N.
Ry. Co. v. Carothers, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 1476, 65 S.W. 833 (Ky. 1901). The rule itself came
into being in 1854 in The Propellor Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152
(1854).
50. 56 Ill. 138 (1878).
51. Id. at 143.
52. Id.
53. See Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Contract Damages, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 56, 58 (1983); Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule,
77 HARV. L. REV. 741, 753 (1964) [hereinafter Note, Unreason in Damages].
54. See Note, Unreason in Damages, supra note 53, at 749.
55. Id. at 751.
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The Bell Committee and Action Commission reports, however,
found that the rule insures that the defendant pay the full compen-
sation due the plaintiff and not benefit from the plaintiff's insur-
ance. 56 The Bell Committee found that traditional compensatory
damages provide insufficient compensation to plaintiffs because
they don't take into account the inconvenience of litigation, unan-
ticipated inflation, and the inroads into damage awards of legal
fees.5" It also noted that the rule is just and enhances deterrence by
forcing the defendant to pay fully for his or her negligence.58
The new Act also alters the collateral source rule. The new sec-
tion states that any medical, hospital, or nursing charges over
$25,000 paid by an insurance company or fund will be deducted
from a recovery. 9 The deduction does not apply to the right of
reimbursement through subrogation, indemnity, or operation of
law and cannot reduce the verdict by more than 50% of the total. 60
To take advantage of this section, the defendant must apply within
thirty days to reduce the judgment.61
Critics believe that the new collateral source rule will affect only
"five percent of all the cases in Illinois, and do absolutely nothing
for the great bulk of lawsuits that are filed in Illinois. '62 While this
statement may not prove accurate, double recovery is avoided by
the modification of the rule.63 The new section allows a plaintiff to
recover the amount he or she paid for the collateral source, while
56. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 39, at 5-203 (citing Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid
Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 10, 465 P.2d 61, 66, 84 Cal. Rptr.173, 178-79 (1970)); ACTION
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 41, at 22. Conversely, the Tort Policy Working Group
recommended the elimination of the collateral source rule. The Working Group found
that the rule made sense when collateral sources were financed by the plaintiff, but found
that the majority of collateral sources presently are financed by employers or govern-
ments. Under these circumstances, the Working Group asserted that the plaintiff re-
ceived a windfall recovery. POLICY REPORT, supra note 27, at 70-71.
57. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 39, at 5-203 (citing Note, Unreason in Damages,
supra note 53, at 750).
58. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 39, at 5-206.
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1205.1 (Supp. 1986).
60. Id.
61. Id. at para. 2-1205.1(1).
62. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 17, at lines 240-41 (statements of
Sen. Schuneman).
63. Birnbaum, supra note 43, at 2. The author noted:
Although the collateral source rule was an effective device in implementing the
common law of deterrence, the justification for the rule has been questioned
under modem tort theory. By definition, a plaintiff involving the application of
the rule has already been partially or fully compensated; application of the rule
therefore amounts to double recovery.
1986]
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avoiding double recovery problems by reducing the recovery by the
amount provided by other entities.
D. Changes in the Availability of Punitive Damages
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Act is its limitations
on punitive damages.' Punitive damages can no longer be men-
tioned in a complaint, but must be requested in a pretrial motion
before the court.65 The motion must be made within thirty days
after the close of discovery. Also, if a punitive damage motion is
granted, the claim will not be affected by an applicable statute of
limitations if the original complaint was timely filed.66 The new
procedural requirements force a plaintiff to prove that a claim for
punitive damages is justified before it can be added to a complaint.
A second punitive damages section in the Act states that a judge
may decide that an award for punitive damages is too high, enter a
remittitur, and order a conditional new trial. Additionally, the
award may be broken down into many different forms. The judge
can divide the award among the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney
and the State of Illinois Department of Rehabilitation. The por-
tion awarded to the plaintiff's attorney may be given without re-
gard to any fee contract. The only requirement is that the award
may not exceed the contingent contract and should take into con-
sideration any special duty that was owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff.67
The punitive damage sections did not alter punitive damage
awards to the same extent as have some other state reform acts or
to the extent recommended in a federal act backed by Orrin G.
Hatch. 68 The section is also not as restrictive as the Illinois Medi-
cal Malpractice Act's total ban on punitive damages. 69 While ad-
vocates of reform claim that increases in punitive damages and
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-604.1 (Supp. 1986).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 2-604.1, 2-1207 (Supp. 1986).
68. S. 1804, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (proposed by Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, R-Utah).
The federal legislation would place a cap on pain and suffering damages. Id.
Missouri has capped non-economic losses, including punitive damages at $350,000.
Similarly, Kansas ($250,000 limit on non-economic damages), Maryland ($350,000 limit
on non-economic damages), Minnesota ($400,000 limit on "intangible" damages), South
Dakota ($1,000,000 limit on damages), Washington ($117,000 to $570,000 limit on dam-
ages), and West Virginia ($1,000,000 limit on non-economic damages) have enacted dam-
age caps. Moskowitz, From Coast to Coast, The Push is on to Limit Liability, Bus. WK.,
April 28, 1986, at 28.
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1115 (Supp. 1986).
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non-economic loss damages have helped fuel the insurance crisis, 70
others claim that the increase in these damages is illusory.7I
Though the new system will add another hurdle for the plaintiff
prior to claiming punitive damages, it will not restrict this right in
deserving cases. Whether a claim for punitive damages will be ap-
pended automatically to each new complaint remains to be seen.
Regardless, it is expected that this extra process will add to the
time and money spent on some cases.
E. Additional Sanctions For Frivolous Pleading
The Act also adds a section that parallels Federal Rule 11 sanc-
tions for frivolous pleading.72 In addition to the Rule 11 language,
section 2-611 adds a clause providing for sanctions against insur-
ance companies that knowingly allow lawyers to sign pleadings
that are frivolous. The portions of the old section 2-611 concern-
ing untrue statements are stricken. The new section states that the
attorney signing a pleading certifies that the information in it is
"well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting law."73
The new sanctions section duplicates the wording of Federal
Rule 11 and forces lawyers to verify their pleadings prior to signing
them. Illinois courts likely will use the existing federal law as a
guideline in construing the new section. The standard applicable
to Federal Rule 11 requires that an attorney certify a pleading or
paper after a "reasonable inquiry" is made that the paper is well
grounded in fact and is "warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law."' 74 Further, the document must not be filed for any improper
purpose.75
70. POLICY REPORT, supra note 27, at 35.
71. Kovach, supra note 2, at 21. Mr. Kovach stated that "the statistic which places
the average product-liability award in 1985 at more than $1.8 million does not include
subsequent award reductions, decision reversals, or defense victories. It's like measuring
an elephant and claiming to know the average size of all the animals on earth." Id.
Mr. Kovack's criticism is borne out by a preliminary study of punitive damage awards
in Cook and San Francisco counties. San Francisco's awards remained stable throughout
the 1980's. In contrast, awards in Cook County doubled between 1980 and 1984. Post-
trial action reduced awards in both counties by an average of 50%. Peterson, Punitive
Damages: Preliminary Empirical Findings, ARAND NOTE 20-22, 44 (1985).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1986).
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
75. Id.
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Rule 11 imposes an affirmative duty to conduct a prefiling inves-
tigation into the facts and law applicable to a document prior to its
filing. 6 A court must impose sanctions once a violation of the cer-
tification requirement is discovered."
The standard for review of a document is one of reasonableness
under the circumstances, and is "more stringent than a good faith
formula.""8 The court will consider the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding the preparation of the document, including
the time allowed for investigation, the facts underlying the asser-
tions, and the law cited in the document.7 9 The test is objective
and a lawyer may not claim an "empty head, pure heart" defense."0
The new Act added a sanctions section to address the problem of
an overly litigious society."' The effectiveness of this section in
curbing frivolous suits is open to question,8 2 although there are in-
dications that courts are beginning to take these motions seri-
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory commitee's note.
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 provides: "If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court... shall impose ... an appropriate sanction."
Id.
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
79. Id.
80. Id. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cast, 771 F.2d 259, 263 (2nd Cir. 1985); Pudlo v.Director,
Internal Revenue Service, 587 F. Supp. 1010, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Schwarzer, Sanctions
Under The New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 187 (1985).
81. CONFERENCE COMMIITEE REPORT, supra note 17, at lines 283-87 (statements of
Sen.Rock).
82. Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.- How go the Best Laid
Plans?, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1985). The effectiveness of Rule 11 was discussed by
judges, magistrates, and practitioners at a symposium of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York. Id. at 1. The participants noted that despite circumstances which
appeared ripe for a Rule 11 motion, none was made. Canon, The History and Purposes of
Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 10, 11 (1985). The lack of time, money, and economic
rewards were cited as reasons for lawyers' reluctance to move for sanctions. Id. at 12.
One study found that there were only 132 reported cases of sanction requests over a two
year period. Of these 132 cases, there were only 52 grants of sanctions. While the study
does not account for the cases that might have been filed but were not because of fear of
sanctions, it illustrates that the imposition of sanctions is so rare that much of an attor-
ney's respect for the Rule may be diminished. Chrein, The Actual Operation ofAmended
Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 16 (1985).
Judicial reluctance to impose sanctions is apparent from a recent opinion by Judge
Getzendanner in the Northern District of Illinois. In Jirus v. City of Berwyn, No.86-
8219 (N.D. Ill. 1987), the plaintiff, a fireman, sued the City of Berwyn because he was
retired mandatorily without the required Bona Fide Occupational Qualification study.
The City admitted liability, but claimed that the plaintiff was entitled only to liquidated
damages until December 31, 1986 under an amendment to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. Id. at 1.
At a pretrial conference, Judge Getzendanner warned the parties that the court had a
similar case before it in which both parties agreed that the ADEA amendment did not
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ously. 83 An aggressive application of new section 2-611 will be
necessary if this section is to curb frivolous lawsuits.
CONCLUSION
The Tort Reform Act attempts to address a perceived insurance
crisis. The new Act changes the former system of comparative
negligence, the doctrine of joint and several liability, and the collat-
eral source rule. Further, it limits punitive damages, and adds
sanctions for frivolous pleadings. Despite the number of altera-
tions, the Tort Reform Act does not radically change tort law.
Moreover, the Act does not regulate the insurance industry and
probably will not solve insurance availability or affordability
problems.
apply to case filed prior to January 1, 1987. The court requested the parties to file memo-
randa in support of their arguments. Id. at 2.
The parties filed their memoranda, but did not mention the applicable portion of the
amendment. Judge Getzendanner stated:
The court is frankly astonished that the parties missed the critical section of
the statute, particularly in light of the information the court gave the parties...
that the EEOC and the Sheriff's Office appeared to agree that the amendments
were not material to the question of remedy. The defendant's memorandum
ordinarily would result in a Rule 11 sanction because it argues a totally insup-
portable legal position. However, the plaintiff's memorandum was almost in-
comprehensible, and the court therefore will not entertain a motion for
sanctions.
Id. at 3.
83. See Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some "Chilling"
Problems in The Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313
(1986); Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards For Rule 11 Sanctions, 100
HARV. L. REV. 630 (1987). In fact, Professor Nelken voiced a concern that Rule I may
chill aggressive advocacy of new and unusual legal claims. Nelken, supra, at 1351.

